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**RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT - A COMPARATIVE  
ANALYSIS BETWEEN ZIONISM AND PAKISTANI  
NATIONALISM**

***Naționalism Religios și Conflict – O Analiză Comparativă între  
Sionism și Naționalismul Pakistanez***

**Abstract:** For centuries religion has been a uniting factor amongst societies that has been instrumentalised by political leaders. However, the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the creation of two states that used a blended form of religious nationalism, Israel and Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. These two states may have been born out of different contexts and differ in the religious philosophies, but upon closer inspection share deeper similarities that are often overlooked because of to their differences. This paper will also seek to analyse the influence of these religious nationalisms on long-standing conflicts in their regions. In the case of Zionism, the longstanding Arab (Palestinian inclusive)-Israeli Conflict, and in the case of Pakistani Nationalism, the conflict over Kashmir and the establishment of Bangladesh from East-Pakistan. It is important to note that both Pakistan and Israel as States were created amid traumatic conflict that significantly influenced the conceptions of their respective forms of nationalism. This paper asserts that religious nationalism in both Israel and Pakistan has been used to start and perpetuate conflicts in both cases even if they started from more secular aspirations. The first section of this paper will focus on giving background for the comparative portion, which will cover the common call for a religious homeland, shift from secularism to more religious nationalism and use of language in order to unite their movements. These sections will also include an analysis in how they affect conflict.

**Keywords:** Israel, Language, Pakistan, Pakistani Nationalism, Zionism

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<sup>1</sup> For Israel see Shenhav 2007: 1-3. For Pakistan see Waseem 2000: 41-43.

### **Call for a Religious Minorities Homeland**

Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism both revolve around the idea of a homeland for their respective religious minorities. Within Zionism this is a call for a Jewish homeland in Israel, and in Pakistani Nationalism with the call for a homeland for the Muslims of India<sup>2</sup> 3.

These calls for a religious homeland were also made at roughly the same point in history, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> - early 20<sup>th</sup> Century. While Zionism has its roots earlier than Pakistani Nationalism, both of these movements gained significant traction with the creation of their states in roughly the same time frame<sup>4</sup>. In fact, both of these movements faced the strongest growth in support for the establishment of religious homelands with an inherently religious identity during the 1930s and 1940s. Within the case of Zionism, the peak waves of immigration before the establishment of Israel were during the 1930s up until the formation of the state, and within the example of Pakistani Nationalism the formation and cohesion of the Muslim league was during the 1930s with the partition of the late 1940s driving the vast majority of migration by the Muslims of India to Pakistan<sup>5</sup>.

However, the scope and scale of immigration differed between the two projects as they held different ethnic priorities. The Zionist movement held that all Jews were of the same ethnicity no matter where they resided within the diaspora and encouraged the immigration of all Jews into its Jewish State. This, along with other push factors within the region, helped to significantly increase Jewish migration into Palestine (and later Israel). This resulted in the dismemberment of diaspora communities which had existed for hundreds of years in favour of a Zionist State<sup>6</sup>. For example, the vast majority of the North African Jewish population had left for Israel due to its appeal for a Jewish state despite living in this region for hundreds of years<sup>7</sup>. While colonial push effects also encouraged this mass migration to Israel, the appeal of a religious homeland for a Pan-Jewish State was strong<sup>8</sup>. Within the case of Pakistani Nationalism, the call for a Religious Homeland did not try to unite under the banner of removing ethnic divisions to create a greater pan-identity. Instead, it relied more on the model of all of the various ethnicities uniting under a common umbrella of Islam to create a Pakistani identity. This is a key difference between the Zionists and the Pakistani Nationalists as the cohesion of Pakistani religious homeland did not rely on the eradication of any previous ethnic identity<sup>9</sup>. For example, under the Zionist Project within Israel, a Mizrahi

<sup>2</sup> For Israel see Kayyali 1977: 103-106. For Pakistan see Carimo 2014: 320-325

<sup>3</sup> Golan 2001: 136-139; Greenberg 2005: 94.

<sup>4</sup> Kumaraswamy 1997: 31-35.

<sup>5</sup> Kumaraswamy 1997: 31-35.

<sup>6</sup> Shenhav 2007: 12-15.

<sup>7</sup> Kayyali 1977: 99-105. Also see Stypinska 2007: 105-110.

<sup>8</sup> Stypinska 2007: 105-110.

<sup>9</sup> Kumaraswamy 1997: 39.

Jew from Iraq would largely abandon most of his Iraqi identity to instead adopt an inherently Israeli one, which spoke a completely different language and had a completely different conception on what it meant to be a Jew<sup>10</sup>. However, if someone like a Bengali Muslim moved into East-Pakistan following the partition, he or she would not have to abandon their previous ethnic identities, was free to continue to speak their own language and cling onto their ethnic identities under the umbrella of being a Pakistani Muslim<sup>11</sup>. This difference in how these movements constructed their religious homeland is instrumental in how they interacted with conflict.

### **Impact of Conflict within Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism**

Both forms of nationalism were met with and shaped by conflict in that both of these movements felt that they would suffer under continued subjugation into perpetuity unless their states came into being<sup>12</sup>. Within the case of Zionism this was seen in the perceived failure of the integration model and the resulting Dreyfus Affair, while within the case of Pakistani Nationalism this was seen as subjugation “by means of ballot box” from the Hindu majority in India<sup>13</sup>. However, the way in which these states imagine a religious homeland had differing effects on their respective conflicts.

With regards to Zionism, the early conflict that it faced was when it attempted to create a Jewish majority in Palestine at the expense of local Palestinian population<sup>14</sup>. This creation of a Jewish Majority had created a different type of conflict to that of Pakistani Nationalism because the Jewish Majority was not present in Palestine prior to Zionism in recent history<sup>15</sup>. This stands in contrast to how the homeland for the Muslims of India was conceived in that the territory that was supposed to be a Muslim Homeland already maintained a Muslim majority<sup>16</sup>. In fact, the conception and borders of what became Pakistan were outlined based on a contemporary majority the Muslims had in certain parts of India. What this meant as far as conflict was concerned was that early forms of conflict in Pakistani Nationalism were based on the notion of unifying the Muslim Majority areas of India, especially in Kashmir which was held by Hindu Majority India<sup>17</sup>. In the case of Zionism, the conflict emerged when the Zionist Jews were attempting create a state in which a united Jewish People would be the majority. The models of unity for these movements differ in that the Zionist one seeks to create a unified Jewish State in which there

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<sup>10</sup> Kayyali 1977: 99-105.

<sup>11</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 716.

<sup>12</sup> Kumaraswamy 1997: 33-35.

<sup>13</sup> Jinnah 1946. Kayyali 1977: 99-102.

<sup>14</sup> Stypinska 2007: 106-110.

<sup>15</sup> Stypinska 2007: 106-110. Shenhav 2007: 12-15.

<sup>16</sup> Jinnah 1946. Also see Carimo 2014: 317-320.

<sup>17</sup> Waseem 2000: 39-43.

had not been a Jewish Majority for several hundreds of years, whereas Pakistani Nationalism imagined a state in which there already was a Muslim Majority but still needed to unify Muslim majority territories such as Kashmir<sup>18</sup>. However, both of the movements still share the commonality of calling for a religious homeland and this call in turn fuelling conflicts that would come to define these movements. It is also important to note how both of these movements may have started on more secular principles but eventually became more religious over time.

### **Shift from Secular to Religious Principles**

It is important to note that both Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism may have called for a homeland for their religious minorities but started on more secular principles. Both Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism relied heavily on uniting their respective religious groups but not necessarily creating religious states<sup>19</sup>. However, as time progressed both of these forms of nationalism became more religiously motivated. When looking at these nationalistic movements beyond the period of their foundations to their shifts towards more religious nationalism, it is interesting to note that neither of these movements has returned to its Secular roots<sup>20</sup>. Within the case of Zionism, this can be seen by the fact that the Zionist movement modelled itself after ethnically driven nationalist movements found elsewhere in Europe. This can be seen with examples such as Theodor Herzl's early conceptions of a Zionist State being based on Secular principles rather than a religious Jewish State<sup>21</sup>. This can also be seen with earlier Pakistani Nationalism, as its early variant under and immediately after Jinnah was far more inclusive of religious minorities who did not fit the traditional majoritarian interpretation of what a Muslim was. This was in part due to the fact that the earlier variant of Pakistani nationalism wanted to unite all of the "Muslims of India" into a united nation, even if they were not mainstream variants<sup>22</sup>. Within both of these Nationalist Movements religion was initially used as a uniting identity but not necessarily the foundation on which the state should be governed<sup>23</sup>. While it is true both forms of nationalism may have started on more secular notes, they both began to depart from these principles at different rates. Within the context of Pakistani nationalism the tension between its secular foundations and more religious forms was much earlier and stronger than

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<sup>18</sup> Kayyali 1977: 99-105. Also see Waseem 2000: 39-43. Also see *Prevailing Religions*, map (Oxford, UK: Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1931), [http://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gaz\\_atlas\\_1931/pager.php?object=23](http://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/gaz_atlas_1931/pager.php?object=23).

<sup>19</sup> Carimo 2014: 319-324. Also Shenhav 2007: 19-24.

<sup>20</sup> Shenhav 2007: 604-607. Also Sharot 2007: 19-23.

<sup>21</sup> Sharot 2007: 19-23. Also see Kayyali 1977: 102-104.

<sup>22</sup> Jinnah 1946. Also see Carimo 2014: 319-324.

<sup>23</sup> Carimo 2014: 319-324. Also see Jinnah 1946.

was found in Zionism.<sup>24</sup> This was seen in examples such as Mawdudi's writings arguing for Islamic State in what would become Pakistan in the early 1940s. They became an essential basis on which more religious forms of nationalism later developed in Pakistan, especially after the 1971 War<sup>25</sup>. In Zionism this shift was much slower as the tenet of maintaining the Jewish Majority state outweighed many calls for a more inherently religious state. This was primarily due to its close modelling after Secular European Nationalist movements which were heavily rooted in secular ethnic-based principles of creating a homeland for a people, not a religious state<sup>26</sup>. This contrast with the use of an Islamic Identity to create a Muslim majority state with the Muslims of India was developed under a model of "Islamic Socialism". Islamic Socialism based itself on secular notions of socialism, but ultimately grounded itself within Islamic morality thus helping accelerate the shift towards religious nationalism more so than Zionism's secularistically-focused ideology<sup>27</sup>. However, despite the stronger secularistic stance of Zionism to Pakistani Nationalism, both forms eventually evolved into more religious forms of nationalism. In fact, both of these movements had their biggest shifts on the spectrum in roughly the same period of time. Within the case of Zionism this occurred after the 1967 Six Day War as the Israeli's no longer felt the threat of annihilation, and within the case of Pakistani Nationalism this shift occurred around the 1971 Bangla War of Independence<sup>28</sup>. In both cases, these major events significantly shifted the national narratives towards a more religious slant, with the spread of Messianic Zionism following the 1967 Six Day War, and the shift towards a more Islamic identity after the loss of East-Pakistan resulting in Islam being declared as the state religion of Pakistan in the 1973 Constitution<sup>29</sup>.

However, the effects on how these movements interpreted their roles as far as expanding their states differ significantly after their shifts towards more religious nationalism. Within the case of Zionism, the scope of its more secular form before the 1967 War was very defensive in its posture as it attempted to stave off annihilation from its Arab neighbours and maintain its Jewish Majority<sup>30</sup>. Within Pakistani Nationalism quite the opposite was true, as the more secular form of Pakistani Nationalism was expansionist in its scope; this was manifested in the hope of uniting the Muslims of India they felt were left behind in Kashmir<sup>31</sup>. After the major watershed moments within both cases they essentially "reversed" roles,

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<sup>24</sup> Carimo 2014: 326-333.

<sup>25</sup> Carimo 2014: 326-333. Also see Shaikh 2008: 599-603.

<sup>26</sup> Sharot 2007: 4-8.

<sup>27</sup> Conn 1976: 112-116.

<sup>28</sup> Sharot 2007: 19-21.

<sup>29</sup> Shaikh 2008: 599-603.

<sup>30</sup> Stypinska 2007: 105-110.

<sup>31</sup> Waseem 2000: 40.

with Pakistani Nationalism becoming far more inwardly focused in maintaining the Muslim Homeland, whereas Zionism became expansionist with the advent of Messianic Zionism as it wanted to move into West-Bank (or Judea and Samaria as referred to by Messianic Zionist)<sup>32</sup>. This is primarily due to how these events affected their forms of nationalism, in that the victory of the 1967 War emboldened the Zionist movement and made it more expansionist in its scope<sup>33</sup>. However, within the case of Pakistani Nationalism, the trauma following the loss of East-Pakistan led to its nationalist movement being more concerned with keeping the state together by increasing its Islamic characteristics to counteract growing regionalism<sup>34</sup>. This shift between expansionist and preservationist posture is important when analysing how the shift between secular to more religious nationalism influenced their respective conflicts.

Both Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism were steeped in conflict both in their secular and religious forms. The scope of their conflicts differed in that Zionist Conflict during its Secular Phase was more defensive in nature and was primarily targeted towards staving annihilation from its Arab neighbours and preserving its Jewish Majority by inhibiting the return of Palestinians who fled during the foundation of the state<sup>35</sup>. This eventually evolved into a more religiously-focused variant of nationalism after the victory of the 1967 War, in which the Messianic Zionists came into prominence with their ideology of creating an ethnically pure Israel in the name of God, irrespective of the Palestinians, significantly localizing the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians with the former now expanding into the latter's territories in order to achieve their vision<sup>36</sup>. This significantly contrasts to how Pakistani Nationalism shifted from its more aspirational form of uniting all of the Muslim provinces and attempting to annex Kashmir, to achieving this by becoming more inwardly focused after the loss of East Pakistan during the 1971 War<sup>37</sup>.

In the case of Zionism, the primary conflict it is dealing with continues to be a localized Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which settlers are at least partially motivated by a messianic Zionist vision of an ethnically pure Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. While it is true that some policy moves, such as the signing of the Oslo Accords, are reminiscent of the Secularist Peace Treaties made after the 1967 War, the implementation of these treaties very much benefited the Messianic Zionists as settlement construction increased and access to land for Palestinians decreased over time<sup>38</sup>. Within the case of Pakistani Nationalism, the 1973 Constitution very

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<sup>32</sup> Sharot 2007: 19-23.

<sup>33</sup> Sharot 2007: 19-23.

<sup>34</sup> Carimo 2014: 326-333.

<sup>35</sup> Stypinska 2007: 110-113.

<sup>36</sup> Sharot 2007: 19-23.

<sup>37</sup> Shaikh 2008: 599-603.

<sup>38</sup> Shaikh 2008: 599-603.

clearly set the country's path towards being a more religious state from its overhaul of the legal system to "conform with the Quran and the Sunnah" to the compulsory study of Islam and the Quran in public schools<sup>39</sup>.

However, the overall degree of becoming more religious forms of nationalism still differ in that Zionism on the whole, even with its Messianic variant, is still more secular than Pakistani Nationalism<sup>40</sup>. While Israeli society became much more conservative, it did not go down the road of implementing measures such as the compulsory education of the Torah and Amidah in all public schools, or attempt within its Constitution to other "non-conformist Jews" (like Reform Jews) like Pakistan did with the Quran/Hadith and declassification of Ahmadiyyas as Muslims<sup>41</sup>. When looking holistically, this shows how the Zionist movement overall kept more to its secular beginnings than Pakistani Nationalism did, even though both became more religious over time<sup>42</sup>. This inclusion and exclusion of people is a major source of tension when analysing how effective these movements were in uniting the various ethnic groups that composed their respective states.

### **Success of Integrating Various Ethnicities Through the Use of Language**

Both Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism attempted to unite their respective ethnic groups with a language that was seen as indigenous to their respective religious groups<sup>43</sup>. While it is true that Judaism can be considered both a race and a religion, prior to the advent of Zionism the vast majority of Jews lived in diaspora communities outside of Palestine and identified with their local ethnicities from the European Diaspora movements. These Jews largely considered themselves to be part of their European states. Within the Middle Eastern Diasporas (and local Palestinian communities) within the Arab world, they largely identified as Arab and spoke Arabic<sup>44</sup>. Within the context prior to Pakistani Nationalism, the concept of the Muslims of India being a united group was a rare concept, with many of them identifying themselves by their regional ethnicity<sup>45</sup>. Once both of these movements created states for their religious groups, they attempted to unite them through the use of a hegemonic language which was meant to bring them together as one nation. The particular choice of the language also had the shared feature of being

<sup>39</sup> "Pakistan's Constitution of 1973, Reinstated in 2002, with Amendments through 2015" in *Constitution of Pakistan (1973)*, Article 25A, Subsection B.

<sup>40</sup> Sharot 2007: 4-8.

<sup>41</sup> Sharot 2007: 4-8. Also see "Pakistan's Constitution of 1973..." in *Constitution of Pakistan (1973)*, Article 25A, Subsection B.

<sup>43</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 716-718. Also see Kumaraswamy 1997: 32-35.

<sup>44</sup> Kayyali 1977: 99-105. Also see Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>45</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 716-722.

indigenous to both Religious groups, with Hebrew dating back centuries for the Jews and Urdu being considered an indigenously Indian, Muslim language<sup>46</sup>. In both of these cases neither language was spoken by large portions of the communities, with regional languages being dominant amongst the Muslims of India, while Hebrew had been a dead language that was only used for worship amongst the Jews with different dominant diaspora languages.

However, these languages differ significantly in how effective they were in their goals of uniting their various Ethnic Groups. Hebrew enjoyed a much greater scale of success in uniting the various Jewish ethnic Groups than Pakistani Nationalism did with Urdu<sup>47</sup>. In fact, within the example of Pakistani Nationalism, the use of Urdu actually had the opposite effect to its unitary goals because of its ineffective adoption rate and regional pride for local languages<sup>48</sup>. This contrasted significantly with the implementation of Hebrew in that the latter was not just modernized from near spoken extinction, but was also adopted on a widespread scale and became an uncontested national language<sup>49</sup>. This resulted in the various languages spoken by the various Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews being effectively eradicated in favour of uniting them around a common language<sup>50</sup>. The distinction between the success of implementing these two languages within their nationalists' movements will be key in analysing how it affected their respective conflicts.

The uniting of various Jewish ethnicities under Hebrew significantly affected how the Arab-Israeli conflict played out. Hebrew was particularly successful in integrating the Mizrahi (Arab) Jews under the banner of Zionism rather than their ethnic identity which could have otherwise given them different sympathies<sup>51</sup>. The inclusion of the Mizrahi Jews allowed for the state to further exclude non-Jews and their identities, which helped to drive conflict between the Mizrahi and other Arabs even if the Jews themselves were of Arab origin<sup>52</sup>. In fact, the majority of Ashkenazi and Mizrahi were not in any way forced by the state to abandon their native language nor did Zionism necessarily call for the eradication of the diaspora languages<sup>53</sup>. But they largely stopped speaking their diaspora languages and did not pass them on to their children because of their belief in the uniting effect of Hebrew<sup>54</sup>. This cohesion allowed for the Zionist movement not to descend into civil conflict over inclusion of various languages which could

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<sup>46</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268. Also see Oldenburg 1985: 716-718.

<sup>47</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>48</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 719-724.

<sup>49</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>50</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>51</sup> Fischbach 2002: 35-39.

<sup>52</sup> Fischbach 2002: 35-39.

<sup>53</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>54</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.



have spelled the end for the Zionist project, especially in its earlier more defensive form<sup>55</sup>. This stands in stark contrast to Pakistani Nationalism's use of the Urdu Language. Unlike the unifying effect that Hebrew had on Zionism, Urdu was not just divisive but actually led to conflict within Pakistan<sup>56</sup>. The failure of Urdu in integrating a majority of its ethnically diverse population contributed to significant conflict within East-Pakistan with the Bengalis, who felt their language should have been the national language even if it was not considered a "Muslim Tongue"<sup>57</sup>. The Bengali example also serves to show how many Pakistanis did not voluntarily give up their mother-tongues, with many Bengalis outright refusing to learn Urdu or speaking it as a distant second language. This stands in stark contrast to the voluntary adoption of Hebrew by the Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews<sup>58</sup>.

The evolution of these languages also affected how much of a unifying force they became in uniting various ethnic groups. With regards to Zionism and Hebrew, the modern Hebrew language kept much of its Semitic roots, making it easier for the Mizrahi Jews to transition from Arabic to Hebrew, but also significantly used German and Russian when modernizing itself<sup>59</sup>. This use of German and Russian was significant in ensuring that the Ashkenazi did not feel too alienated by the Semitic nature of Hebrew as their languages did not share any commonalities with its roots<sup>60</sup>. This compromise in modernizing the Hebrew language was significant in uniting both the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews. This allowed for focusing their attention on other Zionist priorities, such as maintaining the Jewish majority and staving off elimination from Israel's Arab neighbours. In contrast, Urdu was not significantly adapted to make it palatable to its various ethnic minorities, instead opting to stay largely based on Hindi, Arabic and Farsi<sup>61</sup>. This, in combination with the lack of voluntary adoption due to regional pride, contributed to Urdu not being widely adopted and to it becoming an instrument of division instead of unity. This helped cause the implosion of Pakistani Nationalism which led to the conflict resulting in the separation of Bangladesh. This is contrast to Zionism's success in uniting the Jewish ethnicities and in turn keeping the conflict between Israelis and Arabs who threatened to either annihilate them or threaten their Jewish Majority<sup>62</sup>. While it is true that in both cases other factors such as population size, geographical distance and education levels also had significant effects on the effectiveness of the spreading of

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<sup>55</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>56</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 725-730.

<sup>57</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 716-718.

<sup>58</sup> Spolsky 2014: 262-268.

<sup>59</sup> Spolsky 2014: 255-259.

<sup>60</sup> Spolsky 2014: 255-259.

<sup>61</sup> Oldenburg 1985: 725-730.

<sup>62</sup> Stypinska 2007: 110-115.

these languages, these facets, although worth exploring in future discussions, are not detailed here in order to keep a concise analysis.

### **Conclusions**

When analysing Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism it is important to keep in mind that they came from vastly different origins and maintained significant surface level differences. However, when looking deeper into these movements, they start having strong similarities. This is particularly important when analysing other nationalist movements, as going beyond surface level details can yield interesting and meaningful similarities and differences. For example, other movements such as the Palestinian Nationalist movement also went through a similar shift from more secular nationalism, or the failure of uniting various ethnic groups leading to conflict can be observed within the Sri-Lankan Nationalist movement between the Sinhalese and Tamil. This model of research could prove fruitful for future comparisons between cases that may not seem analogous based solely on surface differences.

As far as the outlook of Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism, the trends of these movements discussed in this paper have largely held through. Both Zionism and Pakistani Nationalism continue to be more and more religiously focused, with Pakistan eventually implementing measures such as blasphemy laws and Israel demanding it be recognized as a Jewish state under the Netanyahu administration<sup>63</sup>. Hebrew continues to be the dominant language of the Jews in Israel, while Urdu continues to have issues with widespread adoption even after it became both the official and national language of Pakistan<sup>64</sup>. While Kashmir continues to galvanize headlines around the world, Pakistan is still very much in a state of self-preservation, trying to suppress separatist movements in areas such as Baluchistan<sup>65</sup>. This contrasts with Zionism's continued expansion into the West-Bank at least partly due to religious goals of establishing an ethnically pure Israel. When all is said and done, Zionism continues to have a strong nationalistic pull on Jews (not just in Israel but around the world), whereas Pakistani Nationalism continues to try to maintain what it has gained while trying to suppress sentiments sympathetic to a pre-partition India<sup>66</sup>. Though it is important to note that both forms of nationalism have become far more religiously focused since the conceptions of their respective states as their respective conflicts matured over time. Both forms of nationalism endured the test of time and can serve as models into how future forms of nationalism can manifest themselves in conflicted areas once a religious

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<sup>63</sup> Ibish 2011.

<sup>64</sup> Agrawal 2015.

<sup>65</sup> "Balochistan: The Untold Story of Pakistan's Other War", BBC 2014.

component is introduced and eventually cantered to the identity of the national movement.

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